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THE MEDICARE & MEDICAID
ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
AND THE SAFE HARBOR
REGULATIONS -
WHAT'S NEXT?
by Richard P. Kusserowt
THE MEDICARE and Medicaid anti-kickback statute makes it a
crime to knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit or receive re-
muneration in exchange for the referral of business covered under
Medicare, Medicaid, and other programs. Despite its almost
twenty year history, the statute remains controversial. As discussed
herein, the statute covers a wide range of conduct in order to serve
several important purposes. The health care community has, how-
ever, questioned the breadth of the statute and its proper applica-
tion. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has critical responsibility
in enforcing the statute. OIG has attempted to respond to the con-
cerns of the health care community by providing guidance on the
implications of the statute through promulgation of the "safe har-
bor" regulations' as well as by other means. This article will dis-
cuss the history and purposes of the anti-kickback statute, OIG's
efforts to provide guidance on the proper interpretation of this stat-
ute, including the "safe harbor" regulations, and enforcement of
this statute.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
The Social Security Amendments of 1972 established specific
penalties for fraud and kickbacks in the Medicare and Medicaid
t Richard P. Kusserow is a senior vice president with Strategic Management Associ-
ates, Inc. in Washington, D.C. Until July 31, 1992, he was the Inspector General of the
United States Department of Health and Human Services. The author acknowledges the
assistance of the Inspector General Division of the Office of General Counsel, Department of
Health and Human Services, and particularly Michele L.S. Krantz, Attorney, in the writing
of this article.
1. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952 (1991).
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programs.2 With regard to Medicare, the statute then provided in
relevant part:
(b) Whoever furnishes items or services to an individual for
which payment is or may be made under this title and who solic-
its, offers, or receives any-
(1) kickback or bribe in connection with the furnishing
of such items or services or the making or receipt of such
payment, or
(2) rebate of any fee or charge for referring any such
individual to another person for the furnishing of such items
or services,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both.3
A similar provision was enacted which applied to Medicaid.4 Con-
gress amended the law in 1977, by expanding the prohibited pay-
ments to "any remuneration" which was solicited, received, offered
or paid "directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in
kind."5 In addition, the previous penalty of a misdemeanor was
increased to a felony.6 In 1980, the statute was amended to require
proof of knowing and willful conduct.7
In 1987, the Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback provisions
were combined into the present section 1128B(b) of the Social Se-
curity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b). That section now provides:
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any
remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly
or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind -
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for
the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or
service for which payment may be made in whole or in part
under title XVIII or a State health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or ar-
2. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b)(Medicare),
§ 242(c) (Medicaid), 86 Stat. 1419 (1972).
3. This was codified at § 1877 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1972).
4. This was codified at § 1909 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396h (1972).
5. Medicare-Medicaid Antifraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142, § 4
(1977). The identical prohibition appeared at § 1877(b) of the Act with respect to Medicare
and at § 1909(b) of the Act with respect to Medicaid. Congress expressly intended to "define
the term 'any remuneration' broadly." H.R. Rep. No. 393, 95th Cong., Ist Sess, pt. 1, at 53
(1977) reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.A.N. 3056; see also S. Rep. No. 453, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12
(1977).
6. Pub. L. No. 95-142, § 4, 91 Stat. 1179 (1977).
7. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 917, 94 Stat. 2625
(1980).
8. Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987 (MMPPPA),
Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 4, 101 Stat. 688 (1987).
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ranging for or recommending, purchasing, leasing, or order-
ing any good, facility, service, or item for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under title XVIII or a State
health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five
years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any re-
muneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind to any person to
induce such person -
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing
or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under title
XVIII, or a State health care program, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recom-
mend purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility,
service, or item for which payment may be made in whole or
in part under title XVIII or a State health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five
years, or both.
In addition, in 1987 Congress also made two significant changes
to the statute in response to OIG's concerns about providing an
alternative remedy to criminal prosecution and providing more gui-
dance to the health care industry. First, Congress provided DHHS
an administrative remedy to enforce the statute by excluding viola-
tors from the Medicare, Medicaid, Maternal and Child Health Serv-
ices Block Grant and Block Grants to States for Social Services
Programs.9 Previously, the only enforcement mechanism had been
a criminal remedy, which did not result in many prosecutions be-
cause of the effort and resources required to put together a criminal
case. The exclusion sanction, in certain cases, can be as significant
as a criminal sentence. For example, a hospital cannot be sent to
jail, but would suffer severe financial and public relations conse-
quences by being excluded from the programs.
Second, Congress addressed the situation where, because the
language of the statute was so broad, providers were uncertain as to
what practices were prohibited and what practices were permissi-
ble.10 The consequence of this was that providers were reluctant to
engage in many arrangements which were not harmful to the pro-
9. Id. at § 2, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(7) (1988). "State health care program"
is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(h) (1988).
10. S. Rep. No. 109, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
682, 707-08.
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grams and beneficiaries, and which may even have been helpful.
Congress, therefore, directed the Secretary to promulgate regula-
tions setting forth specific payment arrangements which would be
exceptions to the statute and therefore would not be the basis of
criminal or administrative prosecution.11
In the health care industry, referrals are a potent source of busi-
ness. Because consumers are less knowledgeable about medical is-
sues, they rely on medical experts for referrals. Thus, there is a
tremendous temptation to offer economic incentives to those who
can influence the flow of business. Financial incentives to refer cre-
ate a conflict of interest which can lead to referrals which would not
otherwise occur. Furthermore, even when a referral is clearly nec-
essary from a medical point of view, financial incentives to refer can
obscure a health care practitioner's goal of referring to the best
qualified source. The statute seeks to address these problems and
thereby serves four purposes: (1) preventing overutilization of serv-
ices; (2) containing program costs; (3) preserving patient freedom
of choice; and (4) protecting competition.
The first and most important purpose is to minimize the risks of
overutilization. The statute presumes that if someone can gain fi-
nancially by referring business, the person is more likely to do so,
even when the item or service is not necessary. In all cases, in-
creased utilization increases costs, and sometimes it exposes our
beneficiaries to the health risks of unnecessary medical procedures.
Second, the statute aims at containing costs. In part, it does this
by deterring overutilization. However, even if only medically neces-
sary items or services are provided, the statute protects the program
against the increased costs of those goods and services. Providers
inevitably raise their prices to pass along to consumers and health
care programs the amount of the illegal remuneration they pay to
obtain referrals.
Third, the statute helps to ensure that patients have freedom of
choice among providers, as guaranteed under the Medicare pro-
gram." Assuming that a beneficiary genuinely needs a particular
item, the patient should not be steered to a particular provider for
the service because the referrer is paid a referral fee. As consumers,
we expect those in a position to safeguard our health to keep our
interests uppermost when they refer us to another provider.
Finally, the statute protects competition. When a referral is
11. MMPPPA at § 14(a), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(D) (1988).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1395a (1988).
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based on a referral fee, the free market is distorted. Competition on
the basis of free enterprise values, such as price, quality, and con-
venience is reduced, making it harder for others to compete for the
business.
II. THE "SAFE HARBOR" REGULATIONS
Publication of the safe harbor regulations was the culmination
of an almost four year process. To respond to Congress' direction
that DHHS consult with the health care community before promul-
gating regulations,13 and to educate ourselves on the types of ar-
rangements that existed and would be worthy of protection, OIG
first published a notice of intent to develop regulations, seeking
comments on the content of safe harbor regulations.14 The 137
timely comments OIG received assisted us in developing proposed
regulations, which were published in January, 1989.15 OIG re-
ceived over 750 comments, which were reviewed and considered in
the drafting of the final regulations issued on July 29, 1991.16
In drafting the safe harbor regulations, OIG attempted to bal-
ance two competing concerns. First, we tried to draft the regula-
tions to accommodate as many non-abusive arrangements as
possible. Second, we tried to minimize the risks of allowing abusive
arrangements within the safe harbor. We believe each of the eleven
safe harbors contained in the final rule contains criteria which offer
reasonable assurance that abusive activities will not receive the
comfort of being in a safe harbor.
Many commentators requested that the regulations spell out ge-
neric criteria and that any business arrangement which met these
criteria would be protected. For example, it was suggested that
OIG protect arrangements that were "cost effective" or were an
"accepted business practice." The problem with such criteria is
that they are too subjective to provide much guidance to the public
on how to structure their business arrangements. Consequently, we
opted to set forth as many bright line rules as possible.
The final regulation includes eleven categories of business prac-
tices that will be immune from prosecution under the anti-kickback
statute. These practices are known as "safe harbors" because they
13. H.R. Rep. No. 85 (II), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1987).
14. 52 Fed. Reg. 38,794 (1987).
15. 54 Fed. Reg. 3088 (1989).
16. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952 (1991).
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provide an area where people can act in complete safety from prose-
cution under the anti-kickback statute.
One area of confusion is the effect of not being in a safe harbor.
It is not possible to "violate" a safe harbor. The anti-kickback stat-
ute itself, not the safe harbors, makes conduct illegal. If one's con-
duct implicates the anti-kickback statute, then one runs the risk of
prosecution unless one is in a safe harbor.
A summary of each "safe harbor" follows. This summary is not
designed to substitute for the regulation but, rather, is intended to
highlight some of the critical concerns and resolution of those con-
cerns which are reflected in the final rule. In evaluating any situa-
tion, one should look to the statute and implementing regulations.
1. Investment Interests
The anti-kickback statute prohibits any remuneration in ex-
change for, or to induce, referrals of Medicare or Medicaid busi-
ness. Many health care practitioners have investments in health
care related business, and they refer their patients to these busi-
nesses. A classic example is a general practitioner who owns part of
a radiology center, and sends all of his patients needing x-rays to
that center. Obviously, the more profitable the center is, the more
money the physician will make. The profit distribution the physi-
cian receives from his ownership in the center can be a payment
which induces the referral of Medicare and Medicaid business.
Thus, profit distributions from such an investment can violate the
anti-kickback statute.
OIG recognizes that there are many sound reasons why those
involved in health care would seek an investment in the same indus-
try. For example, it is a natural inclination to invest in a business in
an area where one has familiarity. A physician may refer to his
radiology center because he is familiar with the radiologists and ad-
ministration and is confident that the center will provide good serv-
ices. In addition, there is nothing inherently wrong in seeking an
investment with good profit potential. The problem, however, is
that such investments raise the very concerns that are behind the
anti-kickback statute: that a physician may make a decision con-
cerning the referral of a patient which is influenced by his own fi-
nancial interests. OIG sought to balance these concerns by drafting
safe harbors for investment interests that would permit health care
practitioners to earn profits from investments in health care busi-
nesses, but only if their financial incentive to refer was significantly
diluted.
[Vol. 2:49
MEDICARE
The investment interest safe harbor has two parts - one aimed
at investments in large, publicly traded companies, and one for in-
vestments in smaller entities. OIG drafted a safe harbor that essen-
tially protects profit distributions from large companies on the
theory that a shareholder's dividends do not increase based on that
shareholder's referrals, so that the dividend distribution will not
have the effect of influencing a referral.17
With regard to smaller businesses, we designed a safe harbor
that is intended to protect profit distributions from businesses that
can survive on their own merits rather than simply on the business
referred from interested investors, and where the distributions are
only minimally related to referral patterns. The regulation sets
forth a number of standards which must be met to qualify for this
safe harbor, including that no more than 40 percent of the invest-
ments in each class of investments may be held by investors who are
in a position to make or influence referrals, furnish items or services
or otherwise generate business for the entity; no more than 40 per-
cent of the revenues can be generated from referrals from interested
investors; and a passive investor cannot be required to generate
business. I8 Through these and other standards included in the reg-
ulation, OIG attempted to create room for those in the health care
industry to have the opportunity to invest in health care business
while minimizing the concerns that motivated the passage of the
anti-kickback statute.
2. Space Rental
One of the most traditional schemes for paying kickbacks is to
disguise the payments as rental payments for space. For example, a
physician may refer patients to a company that provides mobile di-
agnostic services. The company may rent space from the physician
to store supplies or equipment. The question, however, is whether
the value of the space being rented relates to the rental payment.
For example, a company which rents a closet from the physician for
$1000/month, or for $100 per hour of use, may be compensating
the physician for referrals via these "rental" payments.
Obviously, in many cases a health care practitioner is legiti-
mately renting space and we have published a safe harbor that is
designed to protect legitimate rental arrangements. The safe harbor
includes several standards, the most significant of which is that the
17. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,984 (1991).
18. 56 Fed. Reg. at 39,584-85 (1991).
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payments must be consistent with fair market value. 19 The regula-
tion defines fair market value as the value of the property for gen-
eral commercial purposes, excluding the value that any party would
attribute to the property because of its proximity to sourses of refer-
rals.20 For example, a physical therapist may rent space near a phy-
sician from that physician believing that the physician will refer
many patients to the therapist because of the close proximity of the
offices. Nonetheless, the property must be rented at a rate that re-
flects its normal commercial value to anyone. This is not a pure
economic evaluation of fair market value, which would likely in-
crease the value of the space to the therapist because of its proxim-
ity to a referral source. But the regulation defines fair market value
in this way to eliminate the factor which is the concern behind the
anti-kickback statute - payment for referral of business. The safe
harbor also requires the agreement to set forth certain information
and be for at least a one year term21 to minimize the risk that the
contract will be repeatedly modified so as to compensate for chang-
ing referral patterns.
3. Equipment Rental
Rental of equipment poses many of the same concerns as rental
of space. The critical question to be evaluated is whether the rent
charged is in exchange for the equipment, or does it also include
payment for referrals? For example, assume a hospital owns a CT
scan which it rents to a radiologist. The hospital is in the position
to influence its staff physicians to refer patients to that radiologist.
The anti-kickback statute prohibits the hospital from receiving pay-
ment for influencing or arranging for referrals, and it precludes the
radiologist from paying for referrals. Arguably any rental payment
from the radiologist to the hospital exceeding the fair market value
could be seen as compensating the hospital, at least in part, for
referrals.
In order to protect legitimate receipt of rents from equipment,
there is a safe harbor for equipment rental which includes standards
similar to the safe harbor for space rental requiring that the rent
must be consistent with fair market value and not be based on the
quantity or value of referrals.22 Fair market value is again defined
as excluding any value which would otherwise be placed on the
19. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,985 (1991).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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equipment because of its proximity to sources of referrals.23 The
regulation also includes standards which restrict the parties' ability
to modify the contract to account for referrals.24
4. Personal Services and Management Contracts
OIG has encountered many situations where an entity that de-
pends on referrals, for example, a laboratory, contracts with a refer-
ral source, such as a physician. Often the physician is required to
perform legitimate services, such as analyzing test results. The
question OIG confronts is whether the payments to the referral
source are for the services provided or for the referrals. If the pay-
ments for the services are significantly higher than the fair market
value of the services provided, this raises the issue of why there is a
high payment - unless the payment is intended to compensate for
referrals. 25 Any payment for services which are provided by some-
one who is in a position to refer could arguably be viewed as pay-
ment for, among other things, referrals. OIG wanted to protect
legitimate payments for services, but not protect payment for refer-
rals. Thus, we designed a safe harbor which has, among its other
standards, the requirement that the payment be consistent with the
fair market value of the services provided and not take into account
the volume or value of any referrals.26
5. Sale of Practice
It has become common for hospitals to buy a physician's ongo-
ing practice. The obvious purpose of such a purchase is to buy a
stream of patients who will continue using the practice and may
also be referred to the hospital for further work.27 This guarantees
a stream of referrals for the hospital, which we believe can lead to
higher program costs and to decisions being made based on finan-
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1985) (Mobile Medical
Industries (MMI) referred lab work to Automated Laboratory Services (ALS) in exchange
for 20 percent kickback. "To account for the kickback payments, MMI provided ALS with
certain services.... The fair market value of these services was substantially less than the
compensation MMI received from ALS, and there is no question that ALS was paying for the
referrals as well as the described services.")
26. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,985 (1991).
27. See e-g., Linda Perry, Advisory Group to Hospita&k Snap Up Physicians Practices,
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 4, 1991, at 40 (Health Care Advisory Board recommends that
hospitals purchase physician practices because they can control where patients are sent for
inpatient procedures and can control the operating expenses physicians incur to care for their
patients).
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cial incentives rather than the patients' best interests. OIG there-
fore limited safe harbor protection to only those situations where a
practitioner buys an ongoing practice of a physician who is retiring
or who for other reasons will not be in a continuous position to
make referrals.28 The safe harbor is limited not because OIG in-
tends to prosecute every other situation involving the sale of a prac-
tice, but because of the difficulty of structuring a broader safe
harbor which would not include purchases where the payments are
intended to compensate the practitioner for his ongoing role in
making referrals.
6. Referral Services
A referral service is a source through which persons in need of
care can obtain the name(s) of physicians or other providers. Many
practitioners depend on such services for patients. Obviously, pay-
ments to referral services by practitioners are payments for refer-
rals. Nonetheless, such services can be useful to consumers.
Safe harbor referral services must meet certain requirements, the
two most critical of which are that any payment to the referral ser-
vice by the physician or other participant are based only on the
costs of operating the referral service rather than the volume or
value of referrals or business generated for the referral service and
that the referral service disclose to the prospective patient various
information concerning the relationship between the physician and
the referral service.2 9 The first requirement addresses the concern
that a referral service cannot be paid for the value of referrals. The
disclosure requirement ensures that prospective patients will learn
what makes the physician or other practitioner qualified to partici-
pate in the service. For example, if a hospital operates a service
which is open only to its staff physicians, it is important for a benefi-
ciary to know whether physicians are required to have any qualifi-
cations beyond being a staff member, and that physicians who are
not included in the referral service may still be qualified. Notably,
this is the only safe harbor that includes a disclosure requirement.
Because a patient has no special relationship with a referral service,
OIG felt disclosure would serve a useful function by enabling a pa-
tient to assess the basis for the referral.30
28. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,985 (1991).
29. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,985-86 (1991).
30. In other cases, we opted against requiring disclosure because we believe the special
relationship between a patient and his or her health care provider may act to undermine the
desired effect of disclosure: making a patient critically assess the referral. If a physician dis-
[V/ol. 2:49
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7. Warranties
Warranties on equipment may implicate the anti-kickback stat-
ute because the manufacturer is using the warranty to induce a con-
sumer to purchase that equipment. Warranties do, however, benefit
the public by ensuring that the manufacturer maintains ongoing re-
sponsibility for the product, thereby giving the manufacturer an in-
centive to produce quality goods.
Thus, the regulations protect payments made pursuant to war-
ranties as long as they meet certain criteria. OIG has incorporated
reporting requirements similar to those in the Discount Safe Harbor
discussed infra to give the programs information which ultimately
may be used in making coverage and reimbursement decisions.3' In
addition, the regulations protect competitive replacement agree-
ments where the agreement honors the initial warranty and does
not provide additional incentives.32 OIG believes that if a patient
needs to replace, for example, a defective pacemaker, he should be
able to choose a different product when another manufacturer is
willing to meet the terms of the original manufacturer's warranty.
8. Discounts
This safe harbor implements the statutory exception for dis-
counts, which states that the statute does not apply to:
a discount or other reduction in price obtained by a provider of
services or other entity under Title XVIII or a State health care
program if the reduction in price is properly disclosed and appro-
priately reflected in the costs claimed or charges made by the
provider or entity under Title XVIII or a State health care
program. 33
The safe harbor defines what OIG believes Congress meant by
"discount. 34 We determined that Congress intended only to pro-
tect reductions in price of the same good or service. We do not
believe Congress intended to protect so-called "bundled purchase
arrangements," where different goods or services are sold together.
Often, such arrangements involve the sale of some good at full price
while others are substantially reduced in price or given away for
free.
closes a financial interest in a medical services company, a patient may just as easily conclude
that the company is superior as that the referral requires further scrutiny because of the
physician's financial interest.
31. Id. at 35,986.
32. Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(A) (1988).
34. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,987 (1991).
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Because the person who offers or gives a discount is not the
same person who must "appropriately reflect" the discount in
claims for program payment, the safe harbor differentiates various
reporting obligations of sellers and buyers. If the seller complies
with its obligations, the seller is insulated from criminal prosecution
and exclusion, regardless of what the buyer does. In addition, re-
porting requirements vary, depending on the type of entity involved
and method of reimbursement.
The most common question OIG is asked is whether the safe
harbor protects all the discounts or other reductions in price that
Congress intended to protect when it enacted the discount excep-
tion. We believe it does. Congress sought to except discounts or
other reductions in price from the reach of the statute to the extent
that they were "properly disclosed" and "appropriately reflected"
in the costs claimed or charges made to the programs. We believe
the safe harbor conforms with Congress's intent to exempt dis-
counts to the extent that they are passed along to the programs in a
manner consistent with the vagaries of different reimbursement
methods.
9. Employees
The anti-kickback statute also excepts from prosecution:
any amount paid by an employer to an employee (who has a
bona fide employment relationship with such employer) for em-
ployment in the provision of covered items or services. 35
In implementing this exception, the safe harbor regulations
adopt the definition of "employee" found in the Internal Revenue
Code at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(2), which defines employee as any indi-
vidual who would be considered an employee under the usual com-
mon law rules applicable in determining the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.3 6 This safe harbor does not pro-
tect payments to independent contractors. Protection for independ-
ent contractors is not justified by the legislative history.37
Moreover, independent contractors are generally not under as close
a degree of supervision as employees, and therefore may be more
likely to engage in abusive conduct. Consequently, in order to re-
ceive protection, payments to independent contractors would have
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B) (1988).
36. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,987 (1991).
37. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,981 (1991) (discussing that Congress passed an exception
which was expressly limited to bona fide employment relationships).
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to meet the requirements of another safe harbor, such as the one for
personal services contracts.
10. Group Purchasing Organizations
The third statutory exception to the anti-kickback statute ap-
plies to:
any amount paid by a vendor of goods or services to a person
authorized to act as a purchasing agent for a group of individuals
or entities who are furnishing services reimbursed under the
XVIII or a State health care program if -
(i) the person has a written contract with each such individ-
ual or entity, which specifies the amount to be paid the person,
which amount may be a fixed amount or a fixed percentage of the
value of the purchases made by each such individual or entity
under the contract, and
(ii) in the case of an entity that is a provider of services (as
defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u)), the person discloses (in such
form and manner as the Secretary requires) to the entity and,
upon request, to the Secretary the amount received from each
such vendor with respect to purchases made by or on behalf of
the entity.
3 8
The safe harbor regulations implement this provision by defin-
ing group purchase organization (GPO) and by reflecting Congress'
concern that GPO fees that exceed three percent are abusive.39
Thus, we protect only those situations where the fee to the GPO is
three percent or less of the purchase price of the goods and services
or where the agreement specifies the maximum amount the GPO
will be paid by each vendor.4'
11. Waiver of Medicare Coinsurance and Deductible In Certain
Cases
This safe harbor implements the fourth statutory exception,
which permits
a waiver of any coinsurance under Part B of the Title XVIII by a
Federally qualified health care center with respect to an individ-
ual who qualifies for subsidized services under a provision of the
Public Health Services Act.41
The safe harbor also permits the waiver of coinsurance and de-
ductible by a hospital who is paid by the prospective payment sys-
tem, as long as the hospital meets certain standards, including not
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(C) (1988).
39. See H.R. Conf. Rep. 1012, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 310-11 (1986).
40. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,987 (1991).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(D) (1988).
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claiming the amount waived as bad debt and thereby shifting the
burden to the Medicare program.42 We have concluded that the
demand for inpatient services is basically inelastic and waiver will
not induce a beneficiary to undergo an inpatient procedure. More-
over, since hospitals are paid a predetermined amount per diagnosis
under the prospective payment methodology, the actual charges to
the beneficiary will not affect how much Medicare must pay.
In other contexts, however, particularly under Medicare Part B,
we view routine waiver of coinsurance and deductible as a serious
violation of the anti-kickback statute, as reflected in a recent OIG
Special Fraud Alert.43
In summary, complying with a safe harbor guarantees that con-
duct which would otherwise violate the anti-kickback statute will be
immune from prosecution.
III. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
The safe harbor regulations are a significant step toward allevi-
ating concerns about the proper interpretation of the anti-kickback
statute. They give the health care community specific guideposts by
which to tailor conduct, and thereby avoid prosecution for a kick-
back violation. The preamble to the regulations provides further
guidance by identifying certain practices that OIG believes may be
abusive and which are, therefore, potential subjects for
42. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,987 (1991).
43. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SPE-
CIAL FRAUD ALERT: ROUTINE WAIVER OF COPAYMENTS OR DEDUCTIBLES UNDER MEDI-
CARE PART B (1991). Medicare beneficiaries are generally required to pay an annual
deductible and then a certain copayment for each item or service covered by Medicare (typi-
cally 20 percent). As the OIG's Fraud Alert explains, requiring Medicare beneficiaries to
share in the costs of items and services is very important because it causes people to be better
health care consumers, and select items or services because they are medically necessary,
rather than simply because they are free. Unfortunately, we have found that many providers
inappropriately waive these fees as a marketing technique to get beneficiaries to order items
or services because they are free (Le., the beneficiary has no out-of-pocket expense) rather
than because they are needed. Ultimately, Medicare ends up paying for unnecessary items or
services. Routine waiver may violate the anti-kickback statute, because providers are unlaw-
fully inducing beneficiaries to obtain services from them. In addition, when providers rou-
tinely waive copayments or deductibles, they may be submitting false claims to the
government. If a provider claims its charge for a service is $100, but routinely waives the
copayment, the actual charge is $80. Medicare should be paying 80 percent of $80 (or $64)
rather than 80 percent of $100 (or $80).
One important exception to the above rule is that providers can waive the copayment or
deductible for particular patients based on their financial hardship. The point, however, is
that a provider must make this determination of hardship on an individualized basis, rather
than automatically waiving these fees for all patients as a marketing technique.
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prosecution. 44
In addition to the safe harbors, however, OIG is taking meas-
ures to assist the public in evaluating whether conduct violates the
anti-kickback statute. First, OIG intends to issue additional safe
harbors in the future. We see this as an evolving process: we will
use comments received from the public and our knowledge of the
health care industry to continually reassess the appropriateness of
existing safe harbors and the need for new safe harbors. This will
enable the industry to continue to develop efficient and innovative
arrangements that increase quality and cost-effectiveness of health
care but do not abuse the Federal health care programs.
Second, we intend to continue to issue Fraud Alerts. In contrast
to the safe harbor regulations, which specify conduct immune from
prosecution, the Fraud Alerts highlight areas where OIG has par-
ticular concerns because of the impact of certain practices on the
health care programs.45 On occasion, OIG also issues reports on
areas which OIG has studied and concluded that kickback
problems exist.'
Third, OIG plans on issuing "interpretive rules" to clarify ambi-
guities in a particular safe harbor or a conflict between two or more
safe harbors. These rules will not address whether a specific fact
situation falls within a safe harbor, but rather, will explain terms or
resolve other questions of more general applicability.
Fourth, as discussed in the next section, OIG will continue to
prosecute violations of the statute. The administrative and judicial
decisions which will result from these prosecutions will assist the
health care community by providing guidance from administrative
adjudicators and the courts on the type of conduct which violates
the statute, and the standards that will be used in evaluating that
conduct. A large step was recently taken in this regard with the
recent decision of the DHHS Departmental Appeals Board
44. See, eg., 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,963 (1991) (regulations do not protect free gifts to bene-
ficiaries); 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,975 (1991) (regulations do not protect sale of physician practices
that extend beyond one year).
45. See, eg., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
SPECIAL FRAUD ALERT: ROUTINE WAIVER OF COPAYMENTS OR DEDUCTIBLES UNDER
MEDICARE PART B (1991); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., SPECIAL FRAUD ALERT: JOINT VENTURE ARRANGEMENTS (1989).
46. See, eg., FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN HOSPITALS AND HOSPITAL-
BASED PHYSICIANS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Pub. No. OIE-09-89-00330 (1991)
(discussing possible violations of anti-kickback statute in financial arrangements between hos-
pitals and hospital-based physicians).
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(DAB)47 in The Inspector General v. The Hanlester Network.48
In the Hanlester Network case, OIG alleged that the Hanlester
Network established three limited partnership laboratories in Cali-
fornia, which were joint ventures owned by various physicians and
the Hanlester Network, which served as the general partner. Our
position was that the joint ventures were shell entities whose pur-
pose was to refer laboratory business from the physician-investors
to SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, which served as the
manager of the laboratories.49
OIG alleged inter alia, that: physicians invested in these part-
nerships with little risk and promises of high rates of return; the
number of shares that the marketing director offered the physicians
sometimes depended on their expected referrals; the partners were
expected to refer their laboratory work to the joint venture;
Hanlester delegated to SmithKline the right to decide whether to
perform the laboratory tests at the partnership labs or to refer them
to SmithKline's central reference lab; SmithKline referred about 90
percent of the tests to its own reference labs; the management agree-
ment between SmithKline and the partnership labs provided that
the labs would bill Medicare and then pay SmithKline 76 percent of
the revenues, thus allowing the partnerships to keep 24 percent for
virtually no work performed; and that these revenues were paid to
the limited partners primarily for their referrals.
In December 1989, the OIG proposed to exclude ten individuals
and entities involved in this case for violations of the anti-kickback
statute. After a two week hearing, the administrative law judge
(ALJ) issued his decision in the spring of 1991, taking a narrow
reading of the anti-kickback statute.5 0 The ALJ concluded that
payments which had the effect of encouraging referrals were not
enough to violate the statute - rather, one needed proof of an
agreement to refer as a condition of payment in order to establish a
violation.5" OIG appealed, and the DAB vacated all the findings
47. The DAB is an administrative body within DHHS that hears a variety of cases,
including cases where someone challenges an exclusion from the Medicare and State health
care programs which OIG has proposed for violating the anti-kickback statute. See generally
45 C.F.R. pt. 16.
48. Hanlester Network, 1991 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 39,566 (1991).
49. SmithKline settled with the OIG in December 1989 for S1.5 million. In addition,
SmithKline agreed to the OIG's understanding of the facts from its investigation, and agreed
to terminate or renegotiate contracts found objectionable by the OIG. However, SmithKline
disputed that its conduct violated the statute.
50. Hanlester Network, 1991 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 39,094 (1991).
51. Id. at 25,5W.
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that the OIG contested in its appeal.52
The DAB held that the statute does not require proof of an
agreement to refer.
The plain meaning of the statutory language, as well as its con-
text, purpose, and history, support a conclusion that a violation
occurs whenever an individual or entity knowingly and willfully
offers or pays anything of value, in any manner or form, with the
intent of exercising influence over a physician's reason or judg-
ment in an effort to cause the referral of program-related busi-
ness. Nothing in the statutory language explicitly or implicitly
requires an agreement, nor can the legislative history or case law
on the anti-kickback statute reasonably be read to require an
agreement. 53
The DAB emphasized that it is necessary to consider all rele-
vant circumstances concerning a transaction or relationship to de-
termine the parties' intent and hence whether the statute was
violated.54 The DAB also rejected the ALl's position that the stat-
ute could not be interpreted broadly because of the wide range of
practices it would implicate." The DAB held that it is not appro-
priate to consider, in determining whether the statute was violated,
whether an arrangement is common since Congress intended to al-
ter many common practices.56 In addition, the DAB noted that
"[i]t is not necessary that a payment succeed in inducing a referral
for it to have been intended to serve that end."5"
The DAB pointed out that the term "any remuneration" means
"anything of value in any form or manner whatsoever. The direc-
tion in which money payments flow in a transaction is not determi-
native of whether remuneration has been paid."5" The DAB found
that the ALl's analysis requiring a direct payment to the referral
source "clearly frustrates Congressional intent to focus on the sub-
stance rather than on the form of the transaction." 59
The DAB held that the OIG need not prove harm to the Medi-
care or State health care programs in order for the ALJ to impose
an exclusion. Rather, once the OIG demonstrates that a party vio-
lated the statute, that party has the burden of proving the absence
52. Hanlester Network, 1991 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) % 39,566 (1991).
53. Id. at 27,740.
54. Id. at 27,762.
55. Hanlester Network, 1 39,094 at 25,542-43.
56. Hanlester Network, % 39,566 at 27,762-63.
57. Id. at 27,755 n.22.
58. Id. at 27,764.
59. Id. at 27,759.
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of harm as a factor to weigh in lessening the length of exclusion.'
On March 10, 1992, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Steven
Kessel issued his decision on remand from the Departmental Ap-
peals Board (DAB) in The Inspector General v. Hanlester Network,
the first administrative case filed under section 1128(b)(7) of the So-
cial Security Act ("Act"), to redress violations of the Medicare and
Medicaid anti-kickback statute (section 1128(b) of the Act). The
Respondents in this case established three joint venture clinical lab-
oratories in California, recruited physicians to become limited part-
ners in the ventures, and paid these partner physicians profit
distributions in return for their referrals of laboratory business
which was reimbursed by Medicare and Medicaid.
Applying standards previously enunciated by the Departmental
Appeals Board in this case on September 18, 1991, the ALl found
that: 1) by offering and paying profit distributions to the limited
partner physicians, all nine of the Respondents violated section
1128(b)(2) of the Act, which prohibits the knowing and willful offer
or payment of remuneration with the intent to induce the referral of
program-related business; and 2) by soliciting and receiving remu-
neration from SmithKline, the contract manager, in return for the
referral of laboratory tests, seven of the Respondents violated sec-
tion 1128(b)(1) of the Act, which prohibits the knowing and willful
solicitation or receipt of remuneration in return for the referral of
program-related business. Based on these violations, the ALJ per-
manently excluded the three laboratories from participation in the
Medicare and state health care programs, and excluded the
Hanlester Network for a period of two years. However, because the
ALl found that no remedial purpose would be served by excluding
any of the four individual Respondents in the case, or one corpora-
tion that acted as a general partner of Hanlester, he did not impose
any exclusions against these parties.
With respect to his decision not to exclude five of the parties, the
ALJ ruled that 1) such exclusions, in this particular case, are not
required by regulations promulgated on January 29, 1992, gov-
erning the Inspector General's sanction and civil monetary penalty
authority (see 42 C.F.R. §§ 1005.4(c)(5) and (6)); and 2) section
1128(b) does not mandate an exclusion of every individual or entity
who has engaged in conduct which authorizes the Secretary to im-
pose and direct an exclusion under section 1128(b). The ALJ found
that the record in the case did not contain evidence supporting a
60. Id. at 27,764.
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finding that any of these Respondents was untrustworthy. This de-
termination was based on the AUI's finding that at the time these
Respondents established the joint venture laboratories, they did not
know that they were violating the Medicare and Medicaid anti-
kickback statute.
The Inspector General is considering whether to appeal the
AUJ's Decision on Remand to the Departmental Appeals Board.
In summary, the DAB's decision in the Hanlester Network pro-
vides broad and extensive guidelines as to whether conduct violates
the anti-kickback statute.
Although OIG is making extensive efforts to continue assisting
in the interpretation of the anti-kickback statute, one step we will
not be taking is issuing rulings in response to questions as to
whether specific fact situations satisfy a safe harbor. As discussed
in the preamble to the regulations,61 we will not be issuing "advi-
sory opinions", primarily because it is virtually impossible to accu-
rately assess a situation where an element of a violation is intent.
Moreover, such an opinion, even with qualifications and limitations,
could be used by parties to unfairly establish a "reasonable doubt"
for criminal prosecution, on the theory that they made some effort
to determine if their conduct was lawful - even if they left out key
elements of the arrangement.
Despite the lack of advisory opinions, the available information
on the statute plainly provides enough guidance so that those who
wish to structure their practices to completely avoid prosecution
may do so. For those who choose to continue operating in a man-
ner that risks prosecution, the next section discusses the enforce-
ment process and the factors OIG considers in determining whether
to undertake an anti-kickback case.
IV. THE OIG ENFORCEMENT PROCESS AND
PRIORITIES
The anti-kickback statute, as previously discussed, is primarily a
criminal statute, but also has an administrative remedy. Thus, the
statute has two enforcement tracks.
Generally, the process will start with an allegation brought to
OIG's attention that someone is violating the anti-kickback statute.
In our experience, these allegations are most frequently made by
61. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,959-60 (1991).
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aggrieved competitors.62 Allegations are generally referred to one
of OIG's ten regional offices (depending on the geographical loca-
tion of the involved parties). Depending on available resources, an
OIG agent will investigate the allegations to determine if they have
merit. If the allegations have merit, then the agent will generally
present the case to a United States Attorney. The United States
Attorney will review the case and evaluate whether we can prove
"knowing and willful" intent to violate the statute beyond a reason-
able doubt. If, due to the facts, or insufficient resources, the United
States Attorney declines the case, OIG will consider whether to
pursue the administrative sanction of excluding the alleged violator
from the Medicare and Medicaid (and other state health care) pro-
grams.63 OIG assesses whether the case merits administrative sanc-
tions, and whether we can meet our standard of proof: to prove a
knowing and willful violation of the statute by a preponderance of
the evidence."
If the decision is made to proceed with an exclusion, OIG will
then send a letter to the alleged violator stating that OIG proposes
to exclude them from Medicare and the State health care programs.
The letter gives the alleged violator the opportunity to request an
administrative hearing and asks the party to set forth any defenses.
The exclusion cannot be imposed until after the alleged violator has
an opportunity for a hearing before an ALJ.65 If the party requests
a hearing, the case is sent to one of the ALJs assigned to the DAB.
After a process allowing for discovery, which basically is limited to
an exchange of documents and rulings on any pretrial motions, a
hearing is held. After the hearing, the parties can file post-hearing
briefs, and then the ALJ will render a decision. Either party may
fie exceptions to the ALJ decision, which will be heard by the Ap-
pellate Division of the DAB, before a panel of three individuals.66
A final decision of the DAB is a final decision of the Secretary.
Thus, if the ruling is adverse for OIG, OIG has no further right of
62. To make an allegation, one can contact one of OIG's Regional Offices or call the
toll-free hotline, 1-800-368-5779.
63. OIG has no authority to seek a financial penalty for kickback violations.
64. Our burden of proof for the sanction of exclusion is less than it would be in a crimi-
nal case. See S. Rep. No. 109, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 10, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 682,
690 ("It is the Committee's intent that the burden of proof requirements... would be those
customarily applicable to administrative proceedings.") Hanlester Network, Ruling on Re-
spondents' Motion and Request for Ruling, (Civil Remedies Division Docket Nos. C-186-C-
192, No. C-208 and C-213) at 2 (1990).
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(f).
66. New regulations dealing with procedures for appealing exclusions will soon be
promulgated. See 55 Fed. Reg. 12,205 (1990) (proposed rules).
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appeal. If the ruling is adverse to the other party, that party has a
right to appeal to Federal District Court to have the DAB decision
reviewed for whether the decision is supported by substantial evi-
dence.67 This is not a de novo hearing.
In determining whether to pursue a criminal prosecution or an
administrative exclusion, the threshold test is deciding whether the
case promotes the goals of the OIG:
to provide leadership and coordination and recommend policies
for activities designed (A) to promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration of, and (B) to prevent and de-
tect fraud and abuse in, [the programs and operations of
DHHS].68
Beyond this general standard, there are many additional specific
factors that go into determining whether a case is worthy of prose-
cution. The degree of harm to programs and beneficiaries, the re-
sources available to prosecute, and the strength of the available
evidence are just a few of the criteria to be considered. Clearly,
OIG must, in any case, assess whether its resources merit a prosecu-
tion. But it is important to recognize that one goal of OIG is to
deter future wrongdoing. Thus, what some may deem a "small"
case, in terms of the impact of the scheme, may well be worth prose-
cuting because of the deterrent effect such a prosecution will have
on similar schemes. That is not to say that OIG intends to prose-
cute what some people call "technical violations" of the statute: sit-
uations which violate the statute but which, as a practical matter,
do not have any negative effect or from which nothing significant
can be gained by terminating the conduct. The point, however, is
that what can be gained from prosecution depends on one's perspec-
tive. In OIG's view, Congress passed the anti-kickback statute be-
cause of its justifiably serious concern over the consequences that
payment for referrals has on the Federal health programs and the
health industry in general. It is OIG's responsibility to implement
this concern through vigorous enforcement of the statute.
We do not intend to automatically reject for prosecution any
case involving past unlawful conduct, merely because the parties
now conform their conduct to a safe harbor. It is the statute, not
the regulations, which makes conduct illegal; depending on the cir-
cumstances involved and the gravity of the violation, such a case
may well be worthy of prosecution because of the past conduct.
However, to the extent that parties who are in violation of the stat-
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(f) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988).
68. Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(2).
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ute make good faith efforts to change their conduct prospectively to
comply with a safe harbor, this factor will be considered in assessing
whether a prosecution is appropriate. Similarly, those cases where
people do not attempt to conform their arrangement to a safe har-
bor are especially ripe for prosecution.
In all events, even if a particular arrangement cannot completely
comply with a safe harbor, the participants will be at less risk if they
make a good faith effort to get close to the safe harbors, and if the
aspects of the arrangement which deviate from the safe harbors do
not implicate the concerns underlying the anti-kickback statute.
Although being close to a safe harbor does not absolutely immunize
someone from prosecution, it does suggest an intent to obey the law,
and that will be accorded due weight by investigators and
prosecutors.
V. CONCLUSION
The past few months have resulted in substantial development
of the law under the anti-kickback statute. The final safe harbors
and the Hanlester Network decision provide a great deal of guidance
as to what is illegal. In addition, OIG's Fraud Alerts and the safe
harbor regulations indicate the types of practices OIG is concerned
about, and the standards that will be used in assessing alleged kick-
back violations. Because the intent of the parties is a crucial ele-
ment in determining whether the statute is violated, it is not
possible to be more specific than we have been in describing unlaw-
ful conduct. It is OIG's hope that health care providers will use
this guidance to conform their conduct to the law and thereby en-
gage in healthy business relationships.
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